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Aadhaar : A Concept Note

The conceptual framework of Aadhaar

The state has to reach its citizens for various reasons. It needs to provide the citizens with services, and even products at times (in the form grant of physical items). It needs to provide the citizens with information and knowledge to lead a better life. Most democratic states today function as welfare states, and the functions and responsibilities entailing upon the states have seen a large increase over the last two centuries – functions that were considered purely in the private domain are now considered core responsibility of state (vaccination, for instance). In other words, the state and its citizens touch upon each other more frequently than at any other point earlier in time.

The state, therefore, needs to identity its citizens. Uniquely.

How the state identifies citizens and non-citizens

The state needs to identify its citizens to provide services. Certain services are meant even for non-citizens – rule of law, for instance. Many of the services in this latter category are in the nature of Public Goods, and citizens and non-citizens share these services in non-excludable and non-rivalrous ways. The state provides various means to identify these groups, in the form of various identity cards or inclusion in lists that provide certain benefits (BPL cards, for instance, provide access to BPL services). Because the various branches of the state provide different identity systems, most citizens usually have multiple identity documents. A minority of the absolutely disenfranchised do not have any document – citizens, and sometimes, non-citizens.

Thus, the following system existed a while back:

  1. Citizens and non-citizens were separate categories, who could prove their identity through different documents.
  2. Citizens mostly had multiple identity documents to enable them to interact with multiple branches of the state
  3. Some of the citizens could seldom avail services of state (except pure Public Goods), and had no identity documents. For the state, they are invisible (except, maybe, during the Census count).

With multiple documents in existence, there is a problem of duplication in access to services. Same person may avail multiple benefits from different branches of the state, although he may not be entitled. Many of these services are rivalrous – this means that a wrongful grant to someone is a wrongful denial to rightful claimant. Hence, there is a need to connect the various identity documents in such a way that wrongful inclusions are controlled. Or eradicated.

Aadhaar and unique identity

Therefore, the state has to identify its citizens uniquely. This way the state can identify which services the citizen/resident is availing from the various branches of the state. Because the state will now know each individual uniquely, it can discontinue the service wrongly availed earlier by a citizen. To take an example, a person can get two ration cards from different locations under two names (or even same name, as most ration card databases are paper-based and offline, and don’t talk to each other – there was seldom any centralised database, until recently), and take subsidised items meant for two persons when he should take only one. The difficulty in making fake or duplicate identity documents might differ, but almost all of the documents can be issued against duplicate names/identities. There was no criterion that could uniquely bind a citizen to a document in such a way that no two documents can be issued to the same citizen. This is where Aadhaar comes in.

Aadhaar provides that criterion for uniquely identifying a person by harnessing the biometrics of the person concerned. The biometrics – ten fingerprints, two iris scans, along with a headshot of the person – are taken against every person, matched against existing identifying documents provided by the person and verified in a preliminary fashion (Proof of Identity and Proof of Address documents), and then these two sets are combined together for a lifetime and beyond – after verifying that those ten fingerprints, two irises and the headshot have not been used by anyone earlier on that system. This creates a unique binary – each biological person, already identified through his PoI and PoA, is given a number that remains attached with him permanently.

Now that a unique number has been given to the person, his identity/number combination is a unique unit with which the different branches of the state interact. Aadhaar ensures that no person can have more than one number/identity attached to him. This ensures that the services do not go to duplicate identities against the same person.

However, for the benefits of Aadhaar to be reaped properly, all branches of the state must know of the Aadhaar number of the person. In this process, every service of the state in which a person is a beneficiary is attached with his Aadhaar number. This process is called Seeding.

Aadhaar and seeding

Aadhaar only provides a platform or paradigm for identity. It is not an identity card or a separate service. To remove duplicate entries from a service of the state – a process called de-duplication – it must be connected with every such service separately. This whole process is called Seeding. While the Aadhaar project was being fashioned, Seeding was presumed to be a given condition. However, various Supreme Court rulings presently make Seeding a difficult process. In the absence of Seeding, the full benefits of Aadhaar cannot be reaped.

Aadhaar and citizenship

The Aadhaar paradigm does not recognize the status of a person. It is a platform for mere identification of a person – and it does so uniquely for every person. Aadhaar does not separate the citizen from the non-citizen, the rich from the poor, the Dalit from the Brahmin, or the Kashmiri from the Bengali. These attributes are governed by other rules – legal and social. Thus, Aadhaar is not a proof of citizenship, like some other documents are – say, Voter ID or Passport. Aadhaar is given to permanent residents of India – those that have stayed for the last 182 days in India continuously. This would include all legal immigrants from all countries. Needless to add, this would also include illegal immigrants who are able to acquire supporting documents for being legally in India for the concerned period – however, the element of fraud can exist in any system or identification system to an extent. Aadhaar cannot be given to Indian citizens who have been away from India for the last 182 days – like the NRIs. Aadhaar is meant for residents of India, and whole Aadhaar ecosystem uses the term ‘resident’ for its clients/customers.

Thus, Aadhaar and citizenship are separate concepts. However, Aadhaar can be used to create a robust list of citizens. Presently, there is no such list of citizens with the state. Once that list is seeded with Aadhaar, it can be de-duplicated to create a clean list. How one is identified to be a citizen is a separate process, and Aadhaar comes into the picture only after such identification has taken place. Presently, such Aadhaar-based list is being prepared in only the State of Assam in its National Population Register. Rife with political controversies, NPR has not been undertaken in other states. In Assam also, the process is mainly being pushed by the Supreme Court.

The uses of Aadhaar

Aadhaar is seldom the basis of selection of a benefit being given by the state. Once identified to be a beneficiary, Aadhaar conclusively proves such a person, and authenticates him where required. When a beneficiary list is de-duplicated, it ensures that no person takes more than one unit of benefit, unless so permitted. In the present environment, de-duplication is the most major benefit of Aadhaar.

While the issue of seeding is embroiled in legal troubles, the Aadhaar-seeded separated databases cannot be connected. If and when Aadhaar-linked databases are connected, it can provide a lot of data and analyses on the use of the benefits. It can even provide awareness of wrongful drawal of benefits by some. For instance, a car owner cannot be in a BPL list. However, if both the BPL list and the car registration list are seeded with Aadhaar, the system can tell us which car owners are wrongly included in the BPL list – and they can be removed. This level of data-sharing is presently not allowed. However, it is possible to foresee a time in the future when various databases would become connected.

Aadhaar can also be used for Authentication. Aadhaar is a number which is tagged against certain information captured during the enrolment process – the biometrics, PoI and PoA of the resident. Thus, the Aadhaar number and any authenticating biometric (say, a fingerprint scan) may provide the underlying data and prove the identity of the person to the satisfaction of a person providing a service. This reduces the cost and time of verification, and improves the quality of data collection for a service provision (since the data comes verified by a govt. process). Given that this authentication process can also be availed of by private persons, authentication shall be a major application of Aadhaar. For instance, the mobile operator Jio used only Aadhaar based authentication for doing KYC for enrolling subscribers on their mobile platform.

Aadhaar and privacy

The state interacts with its citizens. And Aadhaar as an identity platform helps the state in making fruitful interactions. The frequency and quantum of interaction on the Aadhaar platform will tremendously increase in the future. Although the linking of databases presently faces a legal hurdle, it is realistic to expect that the benefits would outweigh the costs, and may inspire a change in the legal position. This interlinking of databases would enable to the state to know a complete picture of its interaction with a unique individual – compiled from all the branches of the state. This is a possible avenue of the loss of privacy of the individual. However, the scope of this apparent loss of privacy would depend upon a few factors:

  1. What transactions are recorded and for what period.
  2. Whether databases of various branches of the state are linked.
  3. What the state intends to do with the analysis of this data.

While the loss of privacy in a post-Aadhaar world is a valid concern, it must be contextualised with the loss of privacy in a hyper-connected world where each of our action leaves tell-tale digital footprints that is saved for eternity and shared for an auctioned price.

Aadhaar and federal relations

Aadhaar was borne of a Central resolution, and later backed up by a Central Act. It is funded by the Consolidated Fund of India, and partly through user charges and fees from the private entities in the Aadhaar ecosystem. The Aadhaar Act makes the use of Aadhaar mandatory for programs and schemes wherein expenditure is borne by the Centre. Many of the schemes are partly funded by the Centre – there is a legal argument borne by precedent that those partly-funded schemes can also make Aadhaar mandatory for participation. Further, many of the schemes by the State governments are also using Aadhaar, either for ensuring identity or even as a precondition for receipt of benefit. Additionally, even private entities are also harnessing the Aadhaar platform for authentication and related application.

Thus, Aadhaar provides a very interesting case wherein the federal relations between the Centres and the states are tested. The case of federal disharmony is more glaring in those cases where parties of different ideologies are governing in the states. West Bengal, for instance, has frequently raised concerns regarding the implementation of the Aadhaar and schemes harnessing it.

Aadhaar and the future

Aadhaar was born in 2010. From concept to implementation took a very short time, atypical of government projects – it helped that it was initially led by a superstar of private industry Sh. Nandan Nilekani, who inspired a start-up culture in the Aadhaar organisation, called UIDAI. Aadhaar has inspired political opposition in the initial days, but has seen a greater consensus lately and has come to be accepted as an identity platform. Being a powerful tool, it is being used or sought to be used by different branches of the state, with notifications coming out on a daily basis. It is a fast changing field where the possibilities of use and probabilities of abuse are great.

Is there a conscious design to the IAS?

Amitabh Pande, a 1971-batch officer of IAS, wrote an article in India Today titled “IAS design conducive to graft” on 17 June 2011. Mr. Pande argues that there are three types of entrants in the service: firstly those who are fluent speakers of English by virtue of being exposed to it from birth by their elite parents; secondly, those that learn the language by dint of perseverance and hard work, and whose parents are middle level officers mainly from the service sectors; thirdly, the others who have a love-hate relationship with the English language, and who are more comfortable with their vernaculars, and as a corollary, are more comfortable in the rough and tumble with the local politics. Of course, Mr. Pande’s arguments are very detailed and nuanced, and this succinct reproduction of his points are for the purpose of recounting only.

Later on in his article, Mr. Pande says that the each of these categories have shown different kinds of corrupt tendencies that essentially draw on their upbringing and their natural or native bias. Thus, the vernacular group finds itself comfortable in the hoi polloi of local politics and politicians. This group

rarely sought careers in the central government, saw little benefit in acquiring specialised technical and professional skills, and had very close relationships with provincial political satraps and local traders and contractors ( forests, mines, liquor, cement, kerosene, civil works). All of them displayed a tremendous appetite for acquiring landed property. The economic profiles of most changed dramatically between the beginning and the end of their careers.

On the contrary, the second and first group would be more comfortable in more ‘white collar’ instances of discretionary corruption that can be easily performed from the cooler confines of their rooms. Also in contrast, these bureaucrats would essentially flock with their own kind of politicians – those that have had culturally and intellectually similar upbringings.

Mr. Pande’s tri-partite distribution of bureaucrats makes for interesting reading. I am presuming his thesis is based on anecdotal evidence over his very long service career. And that is a very important type of evidence gathering. Unfortunately, it would be practically impossible to get survey-based evidence, except perception based survey among a peer-group.

However, when Mr. Pande ventures to the issue of the design of the IAS, he seems to be making a claim that can hardly be substantiated. He says that

[a] major part of the problem in the IAS stems from an inherent design flaw. The architecture of the IAS was consciously drawn from the ICS and it was premised on a social and cultural distance between administration and civil society on the one hand and between the political executive and the civil servant on the other. It was self- consciously elitist and relied on creating a kind of Brahmanical mandarinate which was specifically groomed for the task of governance. The critical mass had to consist of people who shared a certain cultural ethos.

Such a design was obviously at variance with the rough and tumble of the Indian democracy where Realpolitik was increasingly emerging as the only ‘ Real’ Politics.

Instead of redesigning the architecture appropriately to the changing socio- political context, the IAS was sought to be retrofitted by tinkering with its basic design.

In other words, Mr. Pande thinks that the IAS suffers from the following design flaws: firstly, that IAS inherits the colonial DNA of the ICS with the master syndrome fairly ingrained in its mind; secondly, that no conscious or strident efforts were made to change this DNA; thirdly that what was done was a kind of ‘retro-fitting’, meaning that only odds and pieces of this integrally faulty machine were replaced.

This is a very old analysis of the civil services we have today. Unfortunately, it has not been made clear as to what are the alternatives. A bureaucracy in most countries refers to  career civil service, almost always selected on the basis of objective, transparent and open competitive process. Even if there is no ostensible exam as a selection criteria, there is a selection mechanism that tries to arrive at the best possible candidates for manning the service. The nature of the tenure – contractual or permanent – is a minor matter of detail. What is essential, however, is the attempt to find the best persons through an open process that is not restricted to any particular section of the society.

India has been a democracy ever since Independence. And it has always selected its bureaucrats on a democratic principle (except those that directly came from the ICS, who were automatically inducted into the IAS based on their experience) – the principle that every citizen of the nation shall have equal access to and equal opportunity to be selected into the civil service – in fact, even citizens of Nepal and subjects of Bhutan can appear for the civil service in India. Measures of positive discrimination have been used – liked relaxed selection norms and reservation. But these practices of discrimination are included to increase the level playing field, rather than to dislodge it. The pattern of exams have been changed from time to time – and each change has helped some people and caused problems to certain others. For instance, there were huge protests against the change in the exam pattern in 2011. Regardless of the politics or the insinuations of conspiracies behind these changes, the exam always affords an open platform of selection to all.

Thus, it is difficult to find any justification given in the reasoning that the pattern of selection is elitist, or that it is not in sync with the democratic spirit of India. With each passing year, more an more candidates are appearing from all geographic area – and also getting selected.

Beacon of hope, repression, efficiency….

The reason for the recent notoriety of the beacons is the decision of the Union Cabinet on 19 April 2017 to remove all beacons. Working fast, the draft Rules were issued the very next day. It was another measure to remove symbols of the so-called VIP culture in India. In the recent past certain State Governments have also issued similar notifications. Most notably Punjab, which is infamous for the overuse and misuse of the beacon policy. It can be argued that this decision of uprooting the whole beacon policy was taken as the earlier steps to rein in the misuse saw only mixed success.

One would recall that in December 2013, the Supreme Court in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.(C) No.25237/2010 delivered a judgment that was also much discussed in the media and public. The beacons were restricted to

The men in uniform; operational agencies which require un-hindered access to the roads for performance of their duty; those engaged in emergency duties such as ambulance services, fire services, emergency maintenance etc, and police vehicles used as escorts or pilots or for law and order duties shall not be entitled to have red lights but lights of other colours, e.g., blue, white, multicoloured etc.

and a few other specified dignitaries. The sudden removal of beacons from a large section of public servants caused large heartburn – both among elected as well as appointed public servants. Various kinds of subterfuges were devised – new kinds of colours were imagined, as only red and blue beacons were regulated by the SC. Various kinds were parities were pleaded to include one category of persons after another. Although the 2013 judgment severely restricted the beacons, the numbers were still much higher than was warranted in the aftermath of the SC judgment.

The removal of symbols of power is a democratic urge. This urge has been witnessed all throughout history, but especially so in the new democratic world where anyone can question the powerful and the mighty. To segregate people on the basis of public utility is decidedly suspect in the eyes of many. It is not just the beacon and siren that are suspect symbols of power, but every appendage and privilege that comes with public office. Where policy is forged on the pulpit, limits of logic are reached fast, and every norm and standard is questioned anew. Frequently, such symbols vanish upon such close questioning. It is facile to say that in a republic, every person is a sovereign. Even our Prime Minister says that all Indians are VIPs:

The real charm is when, however, the recently de-privileged express anguish at a policy that has benefited them all their lives. Mark the words of Vinod Rai, Ex-IAS and Ex-CAG, in his article titled “Beacon of Repression“:

The sight of a red beacon vehicle created a feeling of revulsion among the public. The vehicle speeding down congested roads in metropolitan cities with blue beacon police vehicles has become such a common sight. They specialise in jumping red lights much to the chagrin of fellow motorists. If you do not give them a pass, you run the risk of facing the ire of the khaki clad in their cavalcade, who excel in unbecoming gestures, and may even land a danda on your bonnet. After all, is it more important for these VIPs than what you and I would have set out to do? Even if it was, they could have stepped out a few minutes earlier.

Curious how wisdom arrives after superannuation.

Beacon of hope, repression, efficiency….

Red beaconsBeacons have always been an envious bone of contention. The beacon may be many things to many people – a status symbol, a token of having ‘arrived’, a relic of colonialism. What people don’t like about it, they project those feelings onto the beacon. It is a beacon of desire – every one would want to sit in a car with beacon, and just live the experience for once, if possible. It is a beacon of aspiration – most mothers would aspire for their children to have the beacon one day. Of hatred – one hates the beacon-wrapped vehicle that breezes past the red light, or gets that extra edge under the blind gaze of the traffic police. And so we must try to understand what is it about the beacon that touches us so strongly.

Beacons serve two purposes – as a symbol of power, and as a marker of privilege. And they are very close to each other.

As a symbol of power, it tells that the occupant of the vehicle has an important status in public life. Thus, a private citizen – no matter how much revered or powerful – is not entitled for it. Since money is so often a substitute for power, this symbol ensures that when it comes to matters of public life, money does not raze over state power. Hence, an Amitabh Bachchan or a Mukesh Ambani does not have a red beacon. However, an representative of the people – howsoever poor, or a government servant – having risen from the slum, can have the beacon. This beacon does not belong to the person, but to the position the person is holding. The moment the position goes, so does the beacon. It is attached to the state (or situation) – hence it is a status symbol (and status symbol is not a bad word).

The beacon is also a marker of privilege. It has rational reason to exist. The beacon can serve the following purpose:

  1. It can tell the toll booth that the vehicle need not pay a toll, and may pass through the exempted/VIP lane. Public servants should not pay toll, just like a private person on company duty does not pay toll from his pocket – the company bears the toll cost. If public servants, including MPs/MLAs are forced to bear the toll, either they would reduce their journeys required in public service, or they would try to earn extra money to pay the toll.
  2. It can tell those manning a secure area that the occupant of the vehicle need not be checked. It saves time.
  3. It can tell the importance of the occupant, and the vehicle can be directed to the proper place.
  4. With different coloured beacons, the vehicles can be segregated according to importance.
  5. On public roads that are always busy, it provides a smoother and faster passage so that the public servant can reach to a venue earlier. He certainly can leave half an hour earlier, but there are only 24 hours in a day, and one cannot leave half an hour earlier if there are ten meetings in a day.

Consider a Chief Minister on a typical day. A CM is allowed to use a commercial flight, or even a chartered chopper, but not a peon. The opportunity cost to the society for each minute in a peon’s and a CM’s life are vastly different. Based on this logic, the society/state allows greater privileges to the CM so that she can reach a place faster. Extend this logic to the roads. To move from one place to another would take an average of one hour. For a ten minute engagement in one area, a CM may have to spend 2 extra hours on the roads to travel like a normal citizen. With ten different meetings or more in a day, the CM would essentially be spending the whole day on the roads. Or she would sit at home or office and stop moving to the outside locations. Society would be the loser.

Removal of beacons may not be such a problem for those very high dignitaries that are given police escort. However, only the very few dignitaries at the top are entitled for an escort who can clear the traffic for the vehicle. Removal of beacon would mean the difference between efficient time management of a public servant, and its absence. I won’t be surprised if the average distance covered by the public servant is reduced in the aftermath of the beacon removal. The beacon ensures a faster passage when on public duty. In a recent survey of Indian traffic speeds by Ola, it transpired that the average speed of vehicles in Indian roads vary between 19.6 Km/hr (Chennai) and 27.1 Km/hr (Hyderabad). This is slow. And time is money, more so for the high dignitaries. A CM late by one minute is 100 wasted minutes where there are a hundred participants.

Can I have two Aadhaar numbers?

No.

An Aadhaar number is unique. The uniqueness works two ways, as I explained in So, what is so unique about Aadhaar:

  1. I and only I have that artifact, and no one else – no two person has the same artifact (an artifact can be anything to identify me – a name, number, visual/barcode, etc).
  2. The artifact belongs to me and I have no other artifact – no person has more than one artifact.

One can apply/enroll multiple times – however, since the Aadhaar number is issued against the biometrics of the person (which is unique), only one Aadhaar number would be issued. Ever.

There are various scenarios why a person can apply multiple times:

  1. The person may have forgotten he had applied earlier.
  2. The person may have lost his earlier enrolment details, and goes to enroll again.
  3. No Aadhaar number has been issued against the enrolment as the enrolment got rejected due to:
    1. Enrolment data was not uploaded properly by the operator.
    2. Data quality was not proper. Maybe the biometrics capture quality was not sufficiently good.
    3. The paper documents given may have failed the quality check of the Aadhaar issuing authority (UIDAI).
    4. The enrolment may have been rejected for any unspecified reason by Aadhaar issuing authority.
  4. One may have nefarious motives, and may try to get multiple Aadhaar numbers to create multiple identities.

However, Aadhaar cannot be created like a Driving licence. One person, though, tried to do the same. In this story, a person enrolled twice for Aadhaar, the second time using fake documents. Since the Aadhaar software does not know which is a false document and which is a true document, it merely issues Aadhaar to the first instance that passes through it (and qualifies their internal quality check). By happenstance, Aadhaar got issued against his false documents (because the data of the second enrolment was uploaded and processed before the other enrolment data). So, here is a gentleman who is stuck with a false identity. Since, he has now to compulsorily connect his PAN card, his mobile connection, his bank accounts and everything else with his Aadhaar (and Govt. is pushing hard for it), he won’t be able to connect anything, as the Aadhaar has wrong details.

As soon as this case to the notice of UIDAI (which must have been during the quality check when the second enrolment data was scrutinized against another Aadhaar number that had already been issued), legal action was taken and an FIR was lodged. The man faces upto three years in jail.

The newspaper article claims that the the man is now stuck with his false Aadhaar number for life. That he would have to change his name and restart his life. This is incorrect. Now that UIDAI knows that an Aadhaar number has been issued wrongly, his Aadhaar number would be withdrawn. Upon re-enrolment, he would be issued a fresh Aadhaar number. However, he would have to face the consequences for forgery, and action under Indian Penal Code as well under the Aadhaar Act would be taken against him. For all we know, he would get his valid Aadhaar number in jail! (Aadhaar is available to everyone who are habitually resident in India, even foreigners and convicted prisoners, but not illegal immigrants).

However, children below five years of age can have two or more valid Aadhaar numbers.

How can children get two or more Aadhaar numbers?

If you are reading this, chances are you are an adult. In which case your Aadhaar enrollment process is very different from that of a child below five years of age. Children of this age group (and there is no lower age limit – a baby can be enrolled as soon as it is born) are enrolled through a much shorter process. The following are the salient features of this process:

  1. Enrolment is online, and data is uploaded on real-time basis. Enrolment cannot take place if there is no internet. Adult enrolments happen on offline device.
  2. Enrolment is done with a tab and a fingerprint scanner. Total device cost is below Rs. 10,000. Being small in size and weight, they can be moved about more easily.
  3. During enrolment, only the photo of the child is taken. Fingerprints and iris scans are not taken. There is no detailed application process. Consequently, enrolment time is about 5-7 minutes, as against adult enrolment time of 20-30 minutes.

However, the real difference is the Aadhaar issuing process. In the case of an adult, fingerprint and iris scans are taken, and are tied to the person/number. If he tries to enroll multiple times (like in the case above), the server would check the new biometrics against the old ones (technically called de-duplication), and refuse a new number as one has already been issued. As I said earlier, Aadhaar number is truly unique – and it works both ways.

In the case of children below five years, no biometrics are taken. The child is tagged/mapped against the Aadhaar number of either its mother or father (in other words, the father or mother must have a valid Aadhaar number before a child below five years can be enroled, and he or she must be present during the child’s enrolment). Further, giving a name of the child during the enrolment is also not mandatory (imagine this – a baby of two days can be enrolled on Aadhaar, but he may not have a name yet). Thus, the same child can be enrolled – either by mistake or by mischievous design – more than once. The poor Aadhaar server would merely think that two separate children of the parent has been enroled. Further, if mother goes for enrolment once and the father in the next, Aadhaar server would merely think they are two separate babies (Aadhaar server does not know that the mother and father are related, or that they are wife and husband). In other words, since no biometrics are taken, no de-duplication is done while issuing Aadhaar number to a child below five.

This is so by design. Small children do not have fully formed biometrics, and they can change fast. The logistics of taking the biometrics and then updating them is huge – remember, we are a big country and there are many children here.

So, don’t be alarmed if there are two or more Aadhaar numbers for a child below five years. As soon as the child turns five, he shall have to update his Aadhaar number and give his biometrics. Now, he can have only one number – thus, after five years of age, one of his Aadhaar numbers would become infructuous.

Did you know?

A child below five having an Aadhaar would have to update his Aadhaar biometric details twice – once when he turns five, and again when he turns fifteen. As per present rules, no biometric detail needs updating if an update/enrolment has been done after fifteen years of age.

But don’t bank on this rule for staying put long. I am sure UIDAI is going to come up updation rules in a while…

 

Be the change….